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ABSTRACT 
Throughout the history of warfare, different countries have used special 
operations in their effort to achieve key strategic objectives. The objectives of 
these special operations ranged from hostage rescue to foreign government 
overthrow. Nonetheless, all of these objectives were of strategic importance for 
the high-level decision makers who conceived and ordered the missions. Thus, 
because of their high potential payoff, these particular special operations aimed 
at achieving strategic objectives could be defined as Strategic Special 
Operations. As a consequence of the international terrorism threat within the 
context of globalization, there is an increased likelihood for Strategic Combined 
Joint Special Operations to be used in the future as an efficient method for 
solving potential international crises. 
This thesis proposes the following principles as the key factors for the 
success of Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations: a balance between 
common and national interests, intelligence sharing, interoperability, and a 
division of responsibilities. Each principle is analyzed with the intention of 
highlighting the possible issues that may appear during the design, preparation, 
and execution of Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations. Last, but not 
least, a model of implementing these principles is proposed as a useful tool for 
political and military decision makers. 
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Throughout the history of warfare, different countries have used special 
operations in their effort to achieve key strategic objectives. These special 
operations have largely relied on surprise, speed, and maneuver in order to 
defeat an often numerically superior enemy.  
The objectives of these special operations ranged from hostage rescue to 
foreign government overthrow, but all of these objectives were of strategic 
importance for the high-level decision makers who conceived and ordered the 
missions. Thus, because of their high potential payoff, these particular special 
operations ordered to achieve strategic objectives could be defined as Strategic 
Special Operations. 
Some of these risky missions, carried out by highly trained commandos or 
by specially trained ad-hoc task forces composed of elements of regular forces, 
succeeded while others failed.  
After the Cold War, the international environment became very complex, 
with many — and sometimes unpredictable — variables. These changes were 
true for the civil society as well as for the military system, and as a result, they 
became increasingly interconnected. The new threat of international terrorism 
appeared and affected the entire international security environment. 
NATO continues its expansion as part of the effort in efficiently responding 
to new global threats, and close cooperation in military operations is required 
among the allied countries in order to preserve the peace, or to effectively solve 
the security issues. Close cooperation is also required between civil and military 
decision makers. 
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The international interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan are two good 
examples of the necessity and reality of military cooperation in solving strategic 
security issues using combined military joint operations. 
Therefore, in the future, the use of Strategic Combined Joint Special 
Operations is plausible and may become an efficient method for solving potential 
international crises. 
B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE  
The scope of this thesis is to analyze the process of planning, preparation, 
and execution of Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations and to explore the 
peculiarities of this process in order to identify the key factors leading to success 
of these operations. 
An analysis of the process of planning, preparation, and execution of 
Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations (SCJSPECOPS), with the intention 
of emphasizing the principles to be followed in order to achieve success, can 
offer a valuable advantage for military and political decision makers.  
This analysis may help the military and political decision makers by 
improving their ability to achieve strategic objectives using this efficient tool.  
C. THESIS STATEMENT 
Vandenbroucke (1993) identified the following five issues as the reasons 
for Strategic Special Operations failure:  
- Inadequate intelligence 
- Poor coordination 
- Provision of faulty information to the national leadership 
- Wishful thinking  
- Inappropriate intervention in mission execution (pp. 152-169). 
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On the other hand, in Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations 
Warfare: Theory and Practice, McRaven (1996) argues that the six principles for 
successful special operations are: 
- Simplicity 
- Security  
- Repetition  
- Surprise  
- Speed 
- Purpose. 
While these principles are applicable to Strategic Special Operations in 
general, due to the peculiarities inherent in Strategic Combined Joint Special 
Operations, additional principles are likely need.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesize that these principles are: 
- Intelligence sharing  
- Balance between common and national interest 
- Interoperability 
- Division of responsibilities. 
D. CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
To identify the principles of Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations, 
it is first necessary to limit the scope of this thesis.  
For this purpose, according to JP 1-02, Strategic Combined Joint Special 
Operations is defined as: 
Specific special operation or special operations prosecuted in 
support of a theater campaign or other operations executed by a 
task force composed of special operations units from one or more 
foreign countries and more than one US Military Department. The 
combined joint special operations task force may have conventional 
nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the 
conduct of specific missions. (DoD, 2008, p. 101) 
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Moreover, this thesis will take into consideration the fact that those 
Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations possess the following two important 
features (Vandedbrouke, 1993, p. 4):  
- they are aimed at fulfilling the major objectives of foreign policy, 
rather than tactical objectives;  
- they are closely monitored during the preparation and execution by 
the highest civilian and military authorities; 
Finally, we will accept that the traditional classification of Special 
Operations as commando type operations and unconventional type operations is 
valid for Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations as well (Lamb, 1995, p. 4). 
E. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter I provides an introduction to Special Operations in the current 
international security environment. In addition, this chapter presents the purpose 
and scope of this thesis, and the proposed hypothesis. Finally, this chapter 
addresses the basic concepts of Special Operations and the need to establish 
the criteria for Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations’ success. 
Chapters II, III, IV, and V discuss the principles on which the design, 
preparation, and the execution of Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations 
must rest in order to achieve a success rate as high as possible. These chapters 
provide a set of useful tools to military and political decision makers faced with 
the need to use this type of operation for the achievement of strategic objectives. 
Chapter VI provides an analysis of the possibilities of implementing these 
principles during the design, preparation, and execution of Strategic Combined 
Joint Special Operations in the contemporary security environment. 
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II. BALANCE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND COMMON INTEREST  
Men are moved by two levers only: fear and self interest 
A man will fight harder for his interests than for his rights.” 
Napoleon Bonaparte 
 
Where commonality of interest exists, nations will enter political, 
economic, and military partnerships. These partnerships can occur 
in both regional and worldwide patterns as nations seek 
opportunities to promote their mutual national interests or seek 
mutual security against real or perceived threats. (ABCA, 2008, p. 
ix) 
A. COMMON INTEREST IN TRANSNATIONAL ALLIANCES 
James Chace (2002) observed that, “Political leaders have only two basic 
tools at their disposal when enforcing the national interest—diplomacy and force. 
But diplomatic negotiation implies compromise” (p. 3). Moreover, Clausewitz's 
well-known description of war as a “continuation of policy by other means” 
supports Chace’s observation (Howard & Paret, 2007, p. 28). Therefore, the only 
way to achieve the national interest when no compromise is possible is the 
application of power, as depicted in Figure 1.  
As Heaney and Rojas (2007) noted, “While the length of a coalition’s life 
may vary by design, it may also fluctuate with the vicissitudes of politics, 
including ideological disputes, altered political opportunity structures, dwindling 
resources, and personality conflicts” (p. 1). While these factors influence the life 
of a coalition, they also have a major influence over the formation of a coalition. 
The political factor, as an expression of national interest, has a major role in 











Joe Bandy and Jakie Smith (2004) realized the importance of common 
interest in the birth of a coalition. They observed that, “Many coalitions begin as a 
way to support only temporary and clearly delimited forms of transnational 
cooperation” (p. 3). Moreover, exploring the matter of coalition formation and 
existence, Sidney Tarrow (2005), identified two main causes of the formation and 
maintenance of a transnational coalition, shown in Figure 2, as: 
- the common interest; 
- the partners’ commitment to pursue together the achievement of a 
common objective (pp. 165-166). 
Beyond ethical considerations in international politics, the legitimacy of the 
national interest of a state is relative. What one state considers justified and 
legitimate, other players in the international arena may consider illegitimate and 
unjust. Situations differ from case to case, but any country will always try to 
benefit from any opportunity to achieve its national objectives.  
 
 
Figure 2.   The Two Main Pillars of Transnational Coalitions 
When the national interests of two or more states are convergent, building 
a political-military alliance may be an efficient way to pursue that interest. Using 
this formula, the involved states share not only the benefits of their actions but 
the potential risks as well.  
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B. COMMON INTEREST IN STRATEGIC COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS 
Based on the preceding paragraph, the common interest is the main 
element that generates and maintains transnational coalitions. When the fulfilling 
of the common interest of a coalition requires the execution of strategic special 
operations, by extension we can say that the common interest generates 
strategic special operations as well. Therefore, strategic special operations may 
become valuable tools for two or more states that decide to form a coalition in 
order to pursue the achievement of common strategic interests in a fragile 
international situation.  
As Heaney and Rojas (2007) observed:  
Coalitions vary in temporal stability. They may be ad hoc and short-
lived — sometimes formed exclusively for the purpose of staging a 
single event — or they may be highly institutionalized and enduring 
— formed with the intention of addressing a wide range of issues 
over a long period of time. (p. 1)  
The speed, surgical accuracy, secrecy, and reduced costs are the 
characteristics that embody Commando type — strategic special operations for 
the quick resolution of potential crises from their earliest stages. 
In addition, special operations are viable options for dealing with 
protracted conflicts when, due to various reasons, conventional operations 
cannot be carried out, or when they did not achieve the expected results. 
Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations may be utilized as force multipliers 
in support of conventional operations as well.  
JP 3-05 viewed special operations as: 
… operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 
environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or 
economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there 
is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often 
require covert, clandestine, or low-visibility capabilities. (DoD, 2003, 
I -1) 
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Because of these characteristics, Strategic Combined Special Operations 
can be used to solve a wide range of delicate international situations. This makes 
them very attractive for achieving the state’s national interests, and a 
transnational coalition’s common interests. 
The multinational task force designated to execute Combined Joint 
Special Operations in order to fulfill transnational common interests is named 
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF). 
Therefore, a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force is primarily 
the result of a military and political transnational cooperation between states that 
have decided to achieve common strategic interests by carrying out special 
operations. 
C. NATIONAL INTEREST VERSUS COALITION COMMON INTEREST 
As previously stated, the participation in the construction of a Combined 
Joint Special Operations Task Force has a clear goal: to achieve a common 
interest by carrying out special operations. However, from case to case, this 
aspect has several different particularities.   
A transnational coalition is usually initiated by the state that has the 
highest national interest in resolving the problem concerned. For this reason, the 
proportion of the national interest of a state within the common interest of the 
coalition may be unequal and nuanced.  
Narlikar (2003) considered three main theories of coalition building:  
- Theories highlighting an interest-based method of coalition-building;  
- Theories emphasizing processes and institutions; 
- Constructivist theories: ideational (based on common beliefs and 
ideas) and identity-based method of coalition formation (pp. 17-33). 




the “interest-based method of coalition-building,” three main different situations 
whereby a state may participate in forming a political-military coalition may be 
distinguished: 
- A direct relationship between the common interest of the coalition 
and the national interest of a state; 
- A complementary relationship between the common interest of the 
coalition and the national interest of a state; 
- An indirect relationship between the common interest of the 
coalition and the national interest of a state (pp. 17-24). 
1. Direct Relationship between the Common Interest of the 
Coalition and the National Interest of a State 
The first situation occurs when the national interests of a state are similar 
to the common interest of the coalition. This is an ideal and purely theoretical 
situation, but it is a good criterion for measuring the cohesion of a transnational 
coalition. When the similarity of the national interests of coalition partners is high 
and reflected in the common interest of the coalition, the coalition is much 
stronger (Weitsman, 2008, pp. 7-8). 
2. Complementary Relationship between the Common Interest of 
the Coalition and the National Interest of a State 
The second situation occurs when the national interest of a state is not 
entirely reflected in the common interest of the coalition. In this case, the national 
interest of a particular state is not necessarily similar to the common interest of 
the coalition. However, the end state of a coalition’s actions may prove 
advantageous to a particular member state by creating favorable conditions for 
further actions in pursuing its national interests (Weitsman, 2008, p. 5).  
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3. Indirect Relationship between the Common Interest of the 
Coalition and the National Interest of a State 
The third situation arises when some countries join a transnational 
coalition due mainly to reasons related to the advantages that membership in 
such a coalition may offer. The interest for participating in coalition operations 
may be motivated by a degree of international or regional prestige and influence 
that can be gained (Weitsman, 2008, p. 5).  
The above relationships between national interest and coalition common 




Figure 3.   The Relationships between National Interest and Coalition Common 
Interest 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The decision to participate in a transnational coalition in general, and to 
conduct Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations in particular, is mainly a 
 12
political-military decision. Considering the benefits and risks that such a decision 
involves, political and military leaders should perform a detailed analysis of the 
situation. Answering the following questions can aid in making such decisions 
easier: 
- Is there a common interest, which requires the creation of a 
political-military coalition, in order to carry out special operations for 
solving a case? 
- How do coalition partners perceive the state’s national interest?  
- How does the international arena perceive the state’s national 
interest?  
- What are the risks and benefits of such an enterprise in terms of 
the state’s national interest? Are the risks acceptable? 
- Do coalition partners agree to share both the benefits and risks 
related to coalition’s actions? 
The main advantage in conducting Strategic Combined Joint Special 
Operations is that the states involved in such operations may share the benefits, 
costs, and risks of such an enterprise. However, for each state, the national 
interest, rather the common interest, is the main reason to be a member of the 
coalition. Accordingly, the balance between the national interest of a state and 
the common interest of a state coalition is the main element that dictates the best 
method in pursuing national interest.  
Therefore, the choice between unilateral Strategic Special Operation and 
Strategic Combined Joint Special Operation — in solving a matter of a state’s 
national interest — should be based on a comprehensive comparative analysis 




III. INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND DISSEMINATION 
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the 
result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, 
for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know 
neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. 
Sun Tzu 
 
The vast majority of military strategists agree with the importance of 
intelligence as a decisive factor during the planning and execution of successful 
military operations.  
As shown below in Figure 4, the intelligence process consists of five 
phases: Planning and Direction, Collection, Processing, Analysis and Production, 
and Dissemination and integration (DoD, 2007, p. I-7). 
 
Figure 4.   The Intelligence Process (From DoD, 2007, p. I-7) 
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All these stages are of equal importance in the effort to provide 
intelligence in support of military operations. However, most analyses concerning 
the modernization of procedures and technologies required to improve the 
intelligence process mainly focus on the collection phase of the intelligence 
cycle. Perhaps the most disadvantaged phase of the intelligence process, in 
terms of methodological progress, is the intelligence dissemination phase.   
The purpose of this section is to stress the importance of the intelligence 
dissemination phase of the intelligence process and to identify the difficulties 
encountered in this phase during the planning and execution of Combined Joint 
Special Operations. 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND 
DISSEMINATION 
No matter how well planned and targeted the intelligence collection effort 
is, it becomes inefficient if the means and methods of collecting information are 
inadequate, insufficient or obsolete. No matter how much qualitative information 
is collected, it loses much of its value if it is not properly processed. No matter 
how well processed the collected information is, it can become a double-edged 
sword either if it is not properly analyzed, or if the analysis is not transformed into 
finite and qualitative intelligence products. More importantly, even if all four of the 
phases above have been successfully carried out, the whole intelligence process 
will be for naught if the final products of the intelligence process do not reach the 
final users. To fail during the dissemination phase of the intelligence process 
means, in fact, to miss the purpose of the entire intelligence cycle (DeConde, 
2002, pp. 225-226).  
The risk of failure during the intelligence dissemination phase may be 
emphasized by one psychological element in the intelligence analyst’s way of 
thinking. Once the pressure during the information collection and analysis has 
passed, and the intelligence products are completed, the intelligence analysts 
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may have a tendency to partially lose their focus, which may affect the 
intelligence dissemination phase (Maltz & Kohli, 1995).  
Moreover, the information/intelligence sharing among various elements of 
a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force — which is actually a more 
difficult case of intelligence dissemination — affects the intelligence process 
starting with the collection phase.  
Vanotten (2005,) observed that, “anytime people from different cultures 
come into contact with one another, there is the potential for tension and 
misunderstanding” (p. 32). He suggested that a psychological premise might 
slow down the information/intelligence sharing process. Such a premise may 
arise because of differences between the intelligence cultures of the CJSOTF 
members. Moreover, it may arise because, at times, some CJSOTF members 
might consider themselves superior to the other members.   
The processes of intelligence dissemination and intelligence sharing, 
which are quite similar from the methodological point of view, are extremely 
important, interoperable elements of a military coalition (Neagoe, 2009, p. 25; 
Hura, 2000, p. 53). Therefore, intelligence dissemination must be treated with the 
same attention as any other phase of the intelligence process  
B. INTELLIGENCE IN COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
Perhaps the most complex environment in which information/intelligence 
is disseminated and shared is the combined joint environment.  
The globalization of threats requires the globalization of efforts to eliminate 
these threats. Combined Joint Special Operations represent one of the ways in 
which militaries respond to these threats. 
Combined Joint Special Operations are characterized by a few elements 




Combined Joint Special Operations involve the joint action of two or more special 
services, belonging to two or more states, in order to eliminate a threat to the 
security of those states (DoD, 2008, p. 108). 
In terms of intelligence, the following features characterize the Combined 
Joint Special Operations environment: 
- Different intelligence cultures, from country to country; 
- Different intelligence cultures, from service to service; 
- Differences between special operations forces’ intelligence 
requirements and conventional forces’ intelligence requirements; 
- Different systems, technologies, methods and regulations used by 
the CJSOTF members during the intelligence process; 
- Differing individual country security issues. 
C. ISSUES IN INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND DISSEMINATION DURING 
COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
Traditionally, Special Operations may be classified into two main 
categories:  commando type and unconventional type (Lamb, 1995, p. 4). 
Combined Joint Special Operations are not an exception to this general 
classification.  
1. Commando Type — Combined Joint Special Operations  
Commando type operations are characterized by high physical risk for the 
performers in the field, high political risk for the planners, short execution time 
and high strategic stakes for the operations. In terms of intelligence 
dissemination and sharing during the Combined Joint Special Operations, there 
are a number of issues that may reduce the efficiency of the intelligence cycle. 
These problems may arise even from the beginning of the planning 
process due to the high strategic stakes of these operations, which sometimes 
involve highly sensitive intelligence held by one or more of the states engaged in 
operations. In this respect, the suspicions and hesitations of some countries to 
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share intelligence — sometimes because of the higher price for which the 
intelligence has been obtained, or the desire to protect the country’s sources —
have become the main elements that slow down the process of intelligence 
dissemination and sharing during the Combined Joint Special Operations. 
Moreover, because the available time to prepare the commando type - Combined 
Joint Special Operations is limited, it is difficult to build an efficient intelligence 
architecture that is able to facilitate the intelligence sharing and dissemination 
(Walsh, 2007, pp. 151-181). 
Another limitation in terms of intelligence sharing and dissemination is 
sometimes represented by the high degree of the information’s sensitivity. 
Sometimes this situation limits the access to certain information for the particular 
members of the CJSOTF. 
An example of how information sensitivity affects the intelligence sharing 
process exists when special operation forces are involved in the execution of a 
mission with conventional forces, or when NATO states are involved in the 
execution of a mission with non-NATO states. In the latter case, NATO members 
may have access to some sensitive information but, due to the information’s 
degree of confidentiality, the members cannot disclose this information to non-
NATO states. 
2. Unconventional Type — Combined Joint Special Operations 
Since the commando type - Combined Joint Special Operations are 
usually short operations, unconventional type - Combined Joint Special 
Operations are long duration operations. Because of their protracted character, 
the volume of information is typically very large in unconventional type - 
Combined Joint Special Operations.  
In their study focused on the general dissemination of market intelligence, 
professors Maltz and Kohli (1995) discovered that the receiver's perception of the 
quality of the intelligence might be diminished by a very large amount of 
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information. Moreover, they found that “if new information is transmitted at a rate 
that goes above the receiver's capability to process it, the receiver might perceive 
the information to be uncertain, incomplete, or contradictory” (Maltz & Kohli, 
1995, pp. 49-50).  
There is no reason to assume that in the case of military intelligence the 
situation would be different. This circumstance calls for the creation of an 
intelligence infrastructure with a complex and flexible architecture capable of 
dealing with a huge volume of information. 
Although a technical infrastructure is essential to facilitate the intelligence 
sharing and dissemination process, paradoxically this infrastructure may 
sometimes alter the process (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008, 
pp. 3-4). This situation may arise due to the following reasons: 
- the need for an accommodation period for the new staff to learn 
operating rules and characteristics of the technological 
infrastructure and the intelligence architecture; 
- the existence of an enormous intelligence database not managed well 
enough through efficient software;  
- the lack of technical and operational knowledge necessary to work with 
the intelligence for some Combined Joint Special Operations Task 
Force’s staff personnel. 
D. CONCLUSIONS  
In combined joint operations, each allied nation has, more or less, a 
different set of regulations regarding intelligence sharing and dissemination. This 
situation affects the Combined Joint Special Operations and requires that a 
method to coordinate and harmonize these regulations be found.  
Recently, referring to coalition operations in Afghanistan, Maj. Gen. 
Gratien Maire (2008), the French embassy’s defense attaché in Washington, 
highlighted the necessity to find a solution for this issue. Military officials must 
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“find the way either to adapt the regulations or to find a way to make sure that 
because of a regulation, we would not be in a situation where some commander 
in the field will not be able to provide some intelligence for the troops that could 
perhaps save lives,” he stated.   
The issues in sharing and disseminating intelligence within Combined 
Joint Special Operations cannot be solved by a universal formula. The 
intelligence sharing and dissemination process’ optimization can be achieved on 
a case-by-case basis by using different methods.  
However, a few general conclusions can be highlighted in order to guide 
this optimization process by focusing the efforts on the following areas: 
- the creation of an intelligence architecture capable of providing 
effective and well-defined channels through which to achieve the 
intelligence sharing and dissemination;  
- the implementation of simple and efficient standard reporting 
procedures;  
- the creation of a proficient Combined Joint Intelligence Team 
capable of managing the intelligence flux during the short or 
protracted combined joint special operations; 
- the use of simple and efficient software for  intelligence 
management in order to facilitate the categorization and 
dissemination of intelligence; 
- the establishment of a clear policy regarding the sharing and 
dissemination of classified information (Hura, 2000, p. 52). 
Moreover, Lowenthal (2006) identified the following questions that must be 
taken into consideration during the intelligence dissemination phase of 
intelligence cycle:  
- Among the large mass of material being collected and analyzed 
each day, what is important enough to report? 
- To which policy makers should it be reported — the most senior or 
lower-ranking ones? To many, or just a few? 
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- How quickly should it be reported? Is it urgent enough to require 
immediate delivery, or can it wait for one of the reports that senior 
policy makers receive the next morning? 
- How much detail should be reported to the various intelligence 
consumers? How long should the report be? 
- What is the best vehicle for reporting it-one of the items in the 
product line, a memo, a briefing (pp. 63-64)?  
Those questions are applicable for the intelligence dissemination phase of 








It is not enough to be joint, when conducting future operations. We 
must find the most effective methods for integrating and improving 
interoperability with allied and coalition partners. Although our 
Armed Forces will maintain decisive unilateral strength, we expect 
to work in concert with allied and coalition forces in nearly all of our 
future operations, and increasingly, our procedures, programs, and 
planning must recognize this reality.     
Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) 
Interoperability seems to be a relatively simple concept to explain and 
implement. In general terms, interoperability:  
is a measure of the degree to which various organizations or 
individuals are able to operate together to achieve a common goal. 
From this top-level perspective, interoperability is a good thing, with 
overtones of standardization, integration, cooperation, and even 
synergy. (Hura et al., 2000, p. 7)  
The specific types and degrees of interoperability are in most cases 
defined, implemented, and measured in terms of the concrete situations within 
which they are addressed. This is mainly because the needs of interoperability 
are fewer and more easily identifiable for a specific situation than for a general 
one. Moreover, many of the interoperability needs not identified during the 
planning phase of the operation emerge and become clearer during the 
execution phase of the operation (Hura et al., 2000, p. 7). 
As a Rand Corporation study on interoperability stated, in political-military 
situations, such as Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations:  
Interoperability often comes at a price. These costs may be difficult 
to define and estimate insofar as they consist of military 
expenditures to enhance interoperability as well as the economic 
and political costs incurred. The issue, of course, is what sorts of 
inter-operability are worth what sorts of costs. (Hura et al., 2000, p. 
7) 
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Therefore, often the first step towards operating “in synergy in the 
execution of assigned tasks” (DoD, 2008, p. 227) consists in conducting a 
comparative analysis between the benefits and the costs of the interoperability 
needs for a given situation.  
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEROPERABILITY 
Conducting strategic military operations implies various levels of military 
command and multiple dimensions of the political spectrum. In this context, from 
the perspective of Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations, the analysis of 
the interoperability issue is better to made using the broadest available definition: 
The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and 
accept services from other systems, units, or forces, and to use the 
services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively 
together. (DoD, 2004, p. GL-19) 
Analyzing the above definition, we can conclude that interoperability is 
important for military operations due to its triple role of catalyst, communicator, 
and decrypter. Thus, it can be asserted that interoperability:  
- becomes the binder that enables different forces and units to work 
together;  
- creates the channels through which these forces and units offer 
and accept each other’s services;  
- ensures the fact that all the implied forces and units are capable of 
using and understanding the exchanged services and information.  
The importance of interoperability mainly consists in supporting national 
security and national military strategies. Moreover, interoperability may reduce 
the costs of participating in a coalition and may offer a base for future coalition 
operations (Hura, 2000, p. 15). 
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B. INTEROPERABILITY IN STRATEGIC COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS 
Referring to command, control, communications, and computer systems 
support of SOF, JP 3-05 (DoD, 2003, p. IV-5) states the following: 
Command, control, communications, and computer (C4) support to 
SOF must be global, secure, and jointly interoperable. 
SOF C4 support consists of multiple and varied groups of systems, 
procedures, personnel, and equipment that operate in diverse 
manners and at different echelons, from the national to the tactical 
levels. 
SOF missions are normally controlled at the lowest operational 
level that can accomplish the needed coordination, although 
political considerations may require control at the national level. 
SOF C4 systems must be interoperable at the appropriate security 
level with the C4 systems deployed by US conventional forces, joint 
commands, allied units and US commercial networks to facilitate 
the seamless transport of critical information and common services. 
These statements confirm the strategic and politico-military distinctiveness 
of Combined Joint Special Operations. Moreover, the efforts to achieve 
interoperability may be guided by transforming the above statements into the 
following question: 
- Who is required to achieve interoperability? 
- For what capabilities and services is interoperability required? 
- What type of interoperability is needed and at what level is 
interoperability required (Hura, 2000, pp. xi-xii)? 
In the following paragraphs, this thesis seeks to answer these questions 
on which the achievement of interoperability depends. 
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1. Who is Required to Achieve Interoperability? 
Given the multinational and political-military nature of the Strategic 
Combined Joint Operations, the first area in which interoperability must be 
achieved is the political sphere. Furthermore, the existence of political 
interoperability is the main factor that determines the feasibility of Strategic 
Combined Joint Operations as effective tools to solve difficult international 
challenges. In this respect, Annette Heuser (2004) argued, “. . .  political 
interoperability must be based on the definition of common challenges, 
instruments, and objectives.” 
For a coalition, the common challenges are threats to the security and 
common interests of two or more states, and the common objective is 
represented by the agreement between involved countries on the desired end 
state in solving the inflamed situation. In terms of common instruments, this 
concept refers to the common vision of the involved states on ways to eliminate 
the threats and on the tools that those states agree to utilize in solving such 
difficult international circumstances (Heuser, 2004).  
One efficient tool that a coalition may use is represented by the Strategic 
Combined Joint Special Operations. In this light, the concept of political 
interoperability proposed by Heuser (2004) may lead us to the following 
conclusion: in order to design, plan, and execute successful Strategic Combined 
Joint Special Operations, interoperability must be achieved among countries’ 
governments, departments of defense, military services, and military branches.  
2. For What Capabilities and Services is Interoperability 
Required? 
The number of elements between which interoperability is required during 
the Combined Joint Special Operations depends on CJSOTF’s structure and its 
relations with other governmental or non-governmental agencies.  
JP 3-05  defines the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force as: 
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A task force composed of special operations units from one or more 
foreign countries and more than one US Military Department 
formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special 
operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. 
The combined joint special operations task force may have 
conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to 
support the conduct of specific missions. (DoD, 2003, p. GL-6) 
According to the above definition, two main models for a Combined Joint 
Special Operations Task Force may be identified: 
- Different SOF services from diffrent countries; 
- Different SOF services and Conventional Force branches  from 
different countries. 
However, in performing their missions, sometime CJSOTF elements may 
need the support of other governmental agencies, such as intelligence agencies. 
Best and Feickert (2006) illustrate this situation as follow: “In practice, military 
personnel may be temporarily assigned to the CIA and CIA personnel may 
temporarily serve directly under a military commander” (p. 2). 
All the above lead to the conclusion that for Strategic Combined Joint 
Special Operations, interoperability must be achieved between the elements of 
special forces, conventional forces, and governmental agencies. 
3. What Types and at What Levels is Interoperability Required? 
Bares (2000) believes that the interoperability mechanism should have the 
following characteristics: 
- Openness ability: the quality of a system, previously connected with 
others, to share a common understanding with them relative to 
some matters of a coalition.  
- Inter-cooperability ability: the capability of a system to share its 
knowledge (and know-how) with its neighboring systems in an 
optimal way, according to the comprehension it can get of the 
evolving situation. 
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- Ability to conduct actions: the competence of a system to do the 
required job in the coalition and, consequently, to completely 
interoperate and furthermore inter-cooperate on all actions 
assigned to it (p. 4-2).  
Applying Hura’s model to Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations, 
we can conclude that the interoperability requirements according to levels of war 
are as follows:  
- Openness ability — at the strategic level; 
- Inter-cooperability ability — at the operational level; 
- Ability to conduct actions — at the tactical level (Hura, 2000, pp. 7-
15). 
C. ISSUES OF INTEROPERABILITY DURING THE STRATEGIC 
COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
Tolk (2003) proposed a model to analyze coalition interoperability using 
two main criteria: organizational interoperability and technical interoperability (pp. 
17-18). In this model, technical interoperability is defined as “the ability to make 
use of functionality offered by other components to increase the functionality 
offered by the own system,” while organizational interoperability refers to 
“harmonization and coordination of operations” (Tolk, 2003, pp. 2, 17). 
Modifying this model in accordance with the features of Strategic 
Combined Joint Special Operations, the resulting structure is shown in Figure 5.  
First, organizational interoperability consists in acquiring harmonization at 
three distinct levels: 
- Political level by harmonizing political objectives; 
- Strategic level by harmonizing strategy/doctrines; 
- Operational level by harmonizing operations (Tolk, 2003, pp. 17-
18).  
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Second, technical interoperability consists of ensuring the functionality of a 
coalition as a stand-alone system by accomplishing compatibility between the 
systems’ elements in three distinct domains: 
- Physical domain; 
- Protocol domain; 
- Operational domain (Tolk, 2003, pp. 17-18). 
Finally, the success in acquiring organizational and technical 
interoperability reflects the capacity of the coalition elements to interact based on 





Figure 5.   Levels of Interoperability in Strategic Combined Joint Special 
Operations (After Tolk, 2003, p. 17) 
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The main utility of this model is that it offers a practical tool to analyze the 
degree of necessary interoperability and identify the issues that may arise in 
pursuing interoperability for Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations, as 
described below.  
1. Organizational Interoperability 
a. Political Objectives  
In order to carry out Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations, 
a Combined Joint Special Operation Task force is required. Due to its combined-
joint nature, this type of task force is essentially the product of a political-military 
coalition. Specifically, in order to generate a Combined Joint Special Operation 
Task Force, we first need a political-military coalition.   
Gamson (1961) stated that for a “full-fledged coalition situation” the 
first condition is that “there is a decision to be made and there are more than two 
social units attempting to maximize their share of the payoffs” (p. 374). This idea 
confirms the importance of a common political objective in generating a 
Combined Joint Task Force by a political-military coalition.  
Although a political-military coalition is able to generate a 
Combined Joint Task Force, due to some possible political issues, the same 
coalition may be unable to generate a Combined Joint Special Operation Task 
Force. These political incompatibilities may be of an internal or international 
nature (Hermann and Hagan, 1998, pp. 132-134). 
An example of an internal political issue is the U.S.-Belgian 
Operation “Dragon Rouge.” After much hesitation, the U.S. government 
authorized the operation but did not authorize the participation of American 
troops in ground operations because of unacceptable domestic political costs 
(Odom, 1988, p. 25). On the other hand, an example of an international political 
issue is the situation in which a coalition member state is not a signatory of the 
same international conventions as the other members. During Operation “Iraqi 
 30
Freedom” Australia was unable to fuel some specific U.S. aircrafts because of 
the Ottawa Treaty (Kelly, 2005, p. 165). Such situations affect participation in 
potential coalition special operations and may affect performance as well.  
These two cases of internal and international political issues show 
the complex role that politics play in shaping political-military coalitions. Even if 
the national interest requires the formation of a Combined Joint Special 
Operation Task Force and the execution of special operations, the particularities 
of internal and external policy dictate participation for all states involved in 
building such a military structure.  
b. Harmonized Strategy and Doctrine  
If political interoperability is achieved, the partner states may decide 
to create a Combined Joint Special Operation Task Force as a tool for fulfilling 
their political goals by executing strategic special operations. The next problem 
that must be solved is the harmonization of the involved countries’ military 
strategy/doctrine. The issue here may be that the military doctrine of one or more 
partner states does not allow the carrying out certain types of special operations. 
That may create difficulties in establishing a common military strategy for 
resolving the problem.  
Dr. James Tritten (1994) identified the “current policy, available 
resources, current strategy and campaigns, current doctrine, threats, history and 
lessons learned, strategic culture, fielded and/or emerging technology, 
geography and demographics, and types of government,” as the major influences 
on military doctrine (p. 6). Because of these influences on a state’s military 
doctrines, acquiring interoperability in this area may be a difficult task and require 
a careful approach. 
c. Aligned Operations  
Once the creation of a Combined Joint Special Operation Task 
Force is justified by identifying shared political goals and by harmonizing 
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partners’ doctrines and strategies, the next step in achieving interoperability is to 
synchronize the military decision making processes and the command and 
control process at the tactical and operational levels.  
At this stage, three distinct areas must be considered: CJSOTF’s 
command and control structure, CJSOTF’s military decision making process, and 
CJSOTF’s relationship with national command and control authorities.  
At the command and control level, the quantity and functional 
representation of every nation in the command and control element must be 
determined based on CJSOTF’s missions and structure (Hura, 2000, pp. 41-43; 
Taillon, 2008).  
The conceptual differences specific to each partner nation may 
affect the CJSOTF’s military decision making process (Hura, 2000, p. 43; Taillon, 
2008). These differences may generate delays, duplications, or omissions while 
conceiving, planning, and preparing operations by the Combined Joint Special 
Operation Task Force.  
Finally, the third domain relates to the degree of independence that 
each national authority offers to its representative element within the Combined 
Joint Special Operation Task Force (Hura, 2000, p. 44; Taillon, 2008). 
Undesirable effects such as delays, hesitations, or blockages may occur in a 
CJSOTF’s military decision process if operational independence is not clearly 
regulated and specified by each national authority. 
2. Technical Interoperability 
a. Physical Interoperability  
The aim of physical interoperability is to harmonize between the 
technical systems that will be used by CJSOTF and to achieve an acceptable 
common level of military training for all units.  
 32
Concerning CJSOTF’s technical systems, the main issue is related 
to communications and weapons systems. The different technical characteristics 
of communications systems and different encryption/decryption technologies are 
two very serious challenges in acquiring the physical interoperability in the 
communications domain (Neagoe, 2009, p. 25). Moreover, a similarly difficult 
situation may arise if CJSOTF units use different types of weapon systems 
(Neagoe, 2009, p. 50; Hura, 2000, pp. 19-20). Such a case will complicate supply 
procedures in acquiring ammunition and spare parts, will increase the 
maintenance needs, and may affect the implementation of common standing 
operating procedures.  
Regarding military training, the various training levels of CJSOTF 
units or different tactics, techniques and procedures used can influence the 
achievement of interoperability because the harmonization of these issues 
requires some additional time which is sometimes unavailable (Hura, 2000, p. 
19). 
b. Protocol Interoperability 
Protocol interoperability is the second layer within the effort to 
achieve technical interoperability and involves three main aspects: language, 
communications, and reports and messages (GAO, 2007, p. 27; Hura, 2000, p. 
48). 
The linguistic aspect of protocol interoperability is critical to the 
human dimensions of the mission. Without a common operational language, a 
mission may fail (Neagoe, 2009, p. 24). Using interpreters for a short period of 
time may represent a compromise formula, but costs to the speed and efficiency 
in military operations may be significant. 
Regarding communication, Peacock (2005), an expert of the 
Voiceboard Corporation, defines radio interoperability as: 
The ability of any commercial, public-safety or military radio user to 
initiate and receive calls at any time without the assistance of an 
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operator. Radio Interoperability allows calls to be made to any other 
radio, packet-switched IP network, or circuit-switched telephone 
network connected user, or a combination of these, when the 
connection is properly authorized by system rules. (p. 1) 
Accordingly, the communications protocol interoperability (system 
rules), represents the capacity to exploit the radio through the use of identical 
frequency, channels, and secrecy keys (capacity that had been built in the phase 
of physical interoperability) in order to achieve a functioning radio network (Hura, 
2000, p. 48). Without achieving this objective, a radio network is ineffective.  
Concerning reports and messages, FM 6-99.2 states, “[protocol 
interoperability] allows a common, authoritative understanding of reporting and 
communicating to exist among all [CJSOTF] elements” (DoD, 2007, p. vi). This 
means that the use of a standard format for reports and messages in CJSOTF 
communications is required in order to increase the clarity and speed of 
information flow. 
c. Operational Interoperability 
Once the physical and protocol interoperabilities are achieved, the 
aim of the operational interoperability phase is to ensure that all CJSOTF 
elements are able to cooperate, act together, and  assist each other during 
military operations (Hura, 2000, pp. 12-13). These objectives can be achieved 
through the execution of common training and are influenced by the time 
available for mission preparation. 
3. Aligned Procedures 
The alignment of CJSOTF procedures is a consequence of achieved 
organizational and technical interoperability. The common standing operating 
procedures and the rules of engagement are the two pillars of a coalition’s 
aligned procedures.  
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The main issue that may arise in this area is that sometimes the rules of 
engagement are not completely suitable for conducting actions at the tactical 
level. This situation appears since the rules of engagement are initially 
formulated based on political, strategic, and operational considerations. This 
discrepancy between the tactical realities and the rules of engagement may have 
adverse effects at the tactical level by limiting freedom of action and exposing 
military personnel to high risks (Reilly, 1996, p. v). 
The second possible issue that may arise is the incompatibility or 
irrelevance of SOPs at the tactical level (Neagoe, 2009, p. 48). This situation 
generally occurs in the early stages of coalition operations because these 
standing operating procedures are established based on the previous military 
experiences of partners. However, at the tactical level a new reality often proves 
to be different from the initial assumptions (Bremer & McConnell, 2006, pp. 30-
32). 
Aligning CJSOTF procedures represents the ultimate goal of the entire 
interoperability process. That is the real outcome of achieving all performance 
goals during the process of accomplishing technical and organizational 
interoperability. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Tolk’s (2003) modified model for achieving coalition interoperability may 
contribute to identifying clear-cut questions to be answered on each layer of 
interoperability. The precise type of questions depends on the real situation in 
which a CJSOTF is going to operate. However, a general interoperability “check 
list” may already be assembled by taking into account the following questions. 
1. Organizational Interoperability 
Political Objectives: 
- Is there an issue whose resolution requires the assembling of a 
CJSOTF?    
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- Do the partners share the same political values?  
- Are the partners ethical backgrounds aligned?  
- Are the partners aware of the political objectives of the coalition?  
- Can establishing a CJSOTF and launching special operations solve 
the problem?  
- What internal and international political cost does this course of 
action involve? Is this cost acceptable in comparison to the 
benefits?  
-  Are the coalition partners aware of the risks involved by the 
establishment of a CJSOTF and its underlying operations? Do 
coalition partners agree to share both the benefits and risks that 
this course of action may imply? 
- Are there any international treaties signed by the coalition’s 
members that may restrict their participation in some of the 
CJSOTF’s operations?  
- Is there a common political vision on how to achieve the coalition’s 
objectives by conducting strategic combined joint special 
operations (Tolk, 2003, p. 19)?   
Harmonized Strategy/Doctrines:  
- Are the partners cultural and social backgrounds aligned?  
- Do the national doctrine and strategy of the coalition partners allow 
the establishment of CJSTOF and the execution of special 
operations?  
- Do coalition partners share a common vision regarding the strategy 
for using a CJSOTF in pursuing proposed goals (Tolk, 2003, p. 
19)? 
Aligned Operations: 
- What structure of command and control is necessary to coordinate 
CJSOTF operations?  
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- What quantitative and functional representation should each 
member of the coalition have within the CJSOTF’s structure of 
command and control?  
- Do coalition partners share a common vision regarding how the 
CJSOTF operations must be shaped in order to pursue proposed 
military goals?  
- Do national authorities offer acceptable freedom of action to their 
national elements in order to conduct operations within the 
CJSOTF’s mandate?  
- Are the military leaders and decision makers aware of their coalition 
partners’ decision making processes peculiarities (Tolk, 2003, p. 
19)?  
2. Technical interoperability 
Physical Interoperability:  
- What units, services, systems, etc., are needed to accomplish the 
mission?  
- What specific capabilities are necessary for the operation? 
- Do the technical systems of CJSOTF’s elements have similar 
technical and tactical characteristics?  
- Do the CJSOTF elements enjoy a similar level of training?  
- Is it possible to achieve full supply and maintenance support for all 
the technical systems of the CJSOTF’s elements? 
- Is it possible to integrate all necessary radio means into a 
communication infrastructure at the tactical level (Tolk, 2003, p. 
18)?  
Protocol Interoperability: 
- Is there a common operational language established within the 
CJSOTF?  
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- Is it necessary to use interpreters? Where are they necessary? 
When are they necessary? Are they available? How can they be 
used without affecting the confidentiality of operations? 
- Are the common secrecy keys, radio frequencies, and channels for 
the CJSOTF’s elements established?  
- Is the communication infrastructure functional and flexible?  
- Is there a commonly established and accepted standard format for 
reports and messages within the CJSOTF (Tolk, 2003, p. 18)? 
Operational Interoperability: 
- Are the tactical elements capable of operating together?   
- Are the operational elements capable of exploiting the 
communication infrastructure (Hura, 2007, pp. 24-25)?  
- Who is best qualified to identify the operational needs and to 
determine how they are to be achieved? 
3. Aligned Procedures 
The following questions will help in directing the final stage of achieving 
interoperability: 
- Are the rules of engagement (ROE) aligned within the tactical levels 
of the operations?  
- What common standing and standard operation procedures 
(SOP’s) are necessary for mission accomplishment? 
- Are the tactics available in the form of SOP?  
- Are the SOPs compatible?  
- How will these SOPs be disseminated and by whom?  
- Are the operational elements able to operate together in 
accordance with mission’s SOPs and within the ROE framework?   
- How will the determination of whether interoperability is achieved 
be assessed , and by whom?  
- What is the role of the different involved units during the operation, 
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V. DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES 
JP 3-05 (2003) defines Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force 
(CJSOTF) as: 
A task force composed of special operations units from one or more 
foreign countries and more than one U.S. Military Department 
formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special 
operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. 
The combined joint special operations task force may have 
conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to 
support the conduct of specific missions. 
That is, in order to create such a military structure, a political agreement 
between two or more states must exist. Moreover, in accordance with FM 3-05, 
special operations’ objectives “are as much political, economic, and informational 
as they are military in nature” (DoD, 2006, pp. 1-6). This highlights the fact that 
the political decision makers are not only involved in the creation of this type of 
political-military coalition, but in the supervision of the coalition’s operations as 
well. Furthermore, the joint aspect of a CJSOTF involves cooperation among 
different types of special operations units, or between special operation units and 
conventional units. Finally, in terms of economy of force, special operations 
forces are “an essential economy of force when military objectives are 
subordinate to political, economic, and informational objectives” (DoD, 2006, pp. 
1-6). All these characteristics qualify special operations as the proper method to 
achieve highly political outcomes at lower material and human costs.  
An appropriate division of responsibilities at the political-military and 
military levels is essential for a political-military coalition, when Strategic 
Combined Joint Special Operations are used for fulfilling coalition common 
objectives. Roman and Tarr observed,  
Political leaders, civilian bureaucrats, and national security 
professionals each lay claim to certain functional prerogatives by 
virtue of their specific offices. However, national security policy 
formulation is a shared domain that links the top political leaders 
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and their national security professionals. Political leaders, military 
professionals, and national security professionals need each other 
in order to make policies, fulfill responsibilities, and to accomplish 
goals. (Feaver and Kohn, 2001, p. 418)  
Dale (2008), noted that “National security professionals are those 
personnel in positions responsible for developing strategies, creating plans to 
implement, and executing common missions in direct support of U.S. national 
security objectives” (p.10). Every politician, soldier, or security professional has 
his area of expertise. A pragmatic cooperation in political-military matters must 
be based on sharing and analyzing professional opinions. In addition, a 
pragmatic cooperation will recommend who is the most qualified to perform a 
certain task within coalition operations (Sloan, 2005, pp. 237-238).  
A. DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE POLITICAL-MILITARY 
LEVEL 
Samuel Huntington (1957) noted, “War is always subordinate to the 
external political ends which determine the extent and nature of the violence to 
be employed” (p. 57). Moreover, Roman and Tarr considered that “civilian and 
military professionals are drawn into policymaking arena by appointees who need 
all the help they can get” (Feaver & Kohn, 2001, p. 404). Furthermore, referring 
to the “civil-military interface,” AJP-3 states that, “Joint forces will usually conduct 
joint operations in cooperation with governmental and non-governmental 
agencies” (NATO, 2007, pp. 1-3). 
The purpose of Strategic Combined Special Operations is to discreetly 
deal with sensitive matters while backing up national interest. If this type of 
matter arises, civilian and military professionals, under the supervision of political 
leaders, are the first to decide upon the necessity of employing Strategic 
Combined Special Operations and assessing the chance of success in solving 
the problem by launching them (Johnson & Metz, 1995, pp. 2-3).  
When focusing on Strategic Combined Special Operations at the military-
political level, three main categories of decision makers are identifiable: political 
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leaders, high-ranking national security professionals, and high-ranking military 
professionals (Johnson & Metz, 1995, pp. 8-13). The challenge here is to identify 
what kind of expertise is needed in order to help the decision making process in 
the field of Strategic Combined Special Operations.  
First, we need to be aware of the “social myth” of professional expertise. 
Usually, at this political-military level, high-ranking professionals are mostly 
involved. That does not mean the professional expertise is directly proportional to 
professional rank. This situation appears because, in time, the high-ranking 
professionals lose a part of their special abilities in their field of expertise as a 
consequence of their high position in which they mostly deal with administrative 
matters instead of training, practicing, and maintaining their professional skills 
(Feaver & Kohn, 2001, p. 405). Therefore, the way political leaders need the 
expertise of high-ranking professionals, the latter need the support and expertise 
of national security professionals and military field experts as well. 
As far as the Strategic Combined Special Operations is concerned, at the 
military-political level the decision should involve two separate steps. The first 
step involves a detailed evaluation of a given situation and whether a special 
operation is the best available course of action (Dalton, 2008, pp. 61-62). Once 
the use of special operations forces is identified as the best suitable course of 
action for solving the problem, the second step is the creation of an interface 
between military-political decision makers and operational forces (Goodpaster, 
1996).  
1. Evaluating the Situation and Identifying the Best Available 
Course of Action 
For this step, the “decision making table” at the national political-military 




Figure 6.   The National Decision Making Table at the Military-political Level 
Using Douglas and Metz’s (1995) analysis on the military-political level, 
the follow responsibilities for the political leaders, national security professionals, 
and the military professionals may be identified. 
a. Political Leaders’ Responsibilities  
- Evaluate how the matter under discussion affects national 
interest at the national and international level; 
- Evaluate the internal and international risks of taking or not 
taking any action to solve the problem; 
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- Evaluate the possibilities of an international coalition to solve 
the problem through combined special operations versus 
unilateral special operations; 
- Initiate the process of identifying the best available course of 
action to solve the problem; 
- Take responsibility for the finally agreed upon course of 
action; 
- Initiate the procedures for establishing an international 
coalition. 
b. High-ranking Military Professionals’ Responsibilities 
- Analyze the military capabilities of the potential 
adversary/target; 
- Estimate the probability of success in engaging the 
adversary/target by different available methods; 
- Estimate the collateral damages of military actions; 
- Estimate the possibilities, advantages and disadvantages of 
a combined military operation versus a unilateral military 
operation; 
- Recommend a military course of action for solving the 
problem; 
- Initiate the procedures for setting a combined military 
operation. 
c. High-ranking National Security Professionals’ 
Responsibilities 
- Analyze the possibility of engaging the adversary/target by 
specific means and methods and the likelihood of success; 
- Analyze the risks involved by using such methods; 
- Analyze the possibility of supporting the military course of 
action recommended by the military professionals; 
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- Estimate the possibilities, advantages and disadvantages of 
cooperation with other foreign security services. 
d. Common Responsibilities for all Political Leaders, High-
ranking National Security Professionals, and the High-
ranking Military Professionals 
- Analyze all proposed courses of action from their 
perspective; 
- Participate in selecting the most advantageous course of 
action; 
- Support the selected course of action by offering the 
necessary resources, personnel and expertise from their 
field of responsibility (pp. 4-14). 
2. Creating a Combined Military-political Interface between the 
National Military-political Decision Makers and CJSOTF 
AJP-3 states, “Military activity at the strategic and operational level will 
clearly be influenced, and ultimately directed by political considerations” (NATO, 
2007, pp. 1-3). 
If the use of special operation forces (by launching a Strategic Combined 
Joint Special Operation) is considered the most advantageous course of action, 
the next step is to establish an interface between the combined operational task 
force (CJSOTF) and the decision makers at the military-political level. 
Similar to the national level, this interface should be composed of three 
categories of decision makers: political leaders, national security professionals, 
and military professionals (Neagoe, 2009, p. 33). At the national military-political 
level, a balance between their political skills, administrative skills, and specific 
professional skills should characterize the decision makers. Nonetheless, at the 
combined military-political interface, highly qualified professionals who 
understand the nature of the relationship between the military and political 
actions are needed. Moreover, besides their political affairs experience, the 
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politicians involved at this level should also have strong knowledge of military 
affairs (Deist, Boog, Maier, and Rahn, 2001, pp. 106-109). 
In analyzing Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo (Odom, 
1988, pp. 25-28; 42-43; 45-59; 61-81) and Dragon Rouge: The Rescue of 
Hostages in the Congo (Wagoner, 1980, pp. 130-136; 137-140; 143-148), a few 
conclusions about how national security professionals and military professionals 
should divide their responsibilities within the structure can be drawn as described 
in the following paragraphs. 
a. Politicians’ Responsibilities 
- Deal with the political aspects of setting up a Combined Joint 
Special Operations Force; 
- Negotiate the quantitative and functional participation within 
the Combined Joint Special Operations Forces according to 
national caveats; 
- Ensure that the operations’ end state supports political aims; 
- Cooperate to establish the rules of engagement to protect 
military personnel in according with international treaties and 
national caveats; 
- Keep national political authorities informed of the status of 
operations. 
b. Security Professionals’ Responsibilities 
- Cooperate in establishing a common strategy of supporting 
the military course of action recommended by the military 
professionals; 
- Facilitate the cooperation between their services and the 
CJSOTF’s elements; 
- Provide intelligence acquired by the CJSOTF elements’ 
services regarding the situation in the area of operations. 
 46
c. Military Professionals’ Responsibilities 
- Advise the politicians on negotiating the quantitative and 
functional participation within the Combined Joint Special 
Operations Forces in accordance with national military 
caveats; 
- Deal with the military aspects of setting up a Combined Joint 
Special Operations Force; 
- Cooperate in establishing a common strategy for engaging 
the target in order to support political aims; 
- Advise politicians on establishing the rules of engagement. 
d. Common Responsibilities for all Political Leaders, 
National Security Professionals, and Military 
Professionals 
- Cooperate in establishing a common strategy for engaging 
the target/enemy in order to fulfill the common political 
purpose; 
- Support the common strategy by engaging the necessary 
resources personnel and expertise from their field of 
responsibility (pp. 32-44.). 
B. DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE MILITARY (CJSOTF) LEVEL 
ABCA (2001) states that:  
The coalition force commander will have to look at which nations 
can offer special capabilities. These capabilities—airlift, special 
operations, intelligence collection, communications, security, and 
logistics—can offset other countries’ shortfalls and enhance overall 
operational competence. (pp. 1-14) 
This statement is an important one for the Combined Joint Special 
Operations Task Force’s commander as well. He must be aware that the division 
of responsibilities at the CJSOTF level may be influenced by two factors: national 
 47
caveats and military proficiency. Depending on these two factors, the CJSOTF 
commander must clearly establish what type of task each CJSOTF element is 
capable of performing and shape each element’s mission.   
C. CONCLUSIONS 
By analyzing the Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations not only as 
a military operation but also as a complex political-military operation, we can 
distinguish three levels of responsibilities: the national political-military level, the 
combined joint political-military level, and the combined joint military level. These 
levels are shown in Figure 7.   
1. The National Political-military Level 
The decision of whether or not to participate in a coalition is made by each 
state at the national level. This political decision is taken after the military and 
national security professionals, under the supervision of high-ranking political 
leaders, carry out a detailed analysis of the situation. At this level, the situation 
analysis consists of an evaluation of the state’s available methods to solve the 
problem and of an assessment of the compatibility degree between the national 
interest and a coalition’s common interest. If the final decision favors participation 
in coalition operations and execution of combined special operations, the 
interested states can begin negotiations. The main purpose of negotiations is to 
conceive the coalition’s common strategic objectives and form a combined 
political-military element aimed at turning those objectives into reality. 
2. The Combined Joint Political-military Level 
At this level, political-military teams or political and military representatives 
from each coalition member state work together. Their common goal is to design 




framework necessary for its materialization. Moreover, at this level the strategy of 
employing CJSOTF in order to accomplish the coalition’s common objectives is 
conceived. 
3. The Combined Joint Military Level 
This area should be exclusively reserved for military and national security 
professionals. At this level, the necessary decisions to achieve CJSOTF military 
objectives are taken in accordance with the strategy established by the high-level 
political-military decision makers. At the combined joint military level, the 
responsibilities for fulfilling the CJSOTF objectives are divided among its 
constituent elements. As long as the decisions taken at the CJSOTF level are in 
accordance with the rules of engagement, any alteration of those decisions 
based on political criteria can be counterproductive. 
As far as the Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations is concerned, 
there must be a division of responsibilities between those three layers and 
between the components of each layer as well. In this way, undesirable 
interferences will be avoided, and thus all the politicians, military professionals 
and security professionals involved will be given the opportunity to effectively use 






















This thesis proposes a political-military approach to the domain of 
Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations. It argues that, beside McRaven’s 
widely accepted six principles of special operations, four additional principles — 
balance between common and national interest, intelligence sharing, 
interoperability, and division of responsibilities — are necessary for the 
successful execution of Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations. 
A. BALANCE BETWEEN COMMON AND NATIONAL INTEREST 
The first principle, balance between common and national interest, is 
important because SCJSPECOPS are transnational military operations pursuing 
the fulfillment of a common goal. This common goal is composed, in variable 
percentages, of the partners’ national goals. Moreover, the members of a 
coalition decide to use SCJSPECOPS after all political possibilities of achieving 
national objectives are ruled out and when using conventional forces is neither 
necessary nor recommended. 
The two pillars of a transnational coalition are common interest and the 
partners’ commitment to pursue together the achievement of a common interest. 
The balance between the coalition’s common interest and member states’ 
national interest influences the strength of the partnership. 
There are three types of relations between the common interest of the 
coalition and the national interest of a state: direct, complementary, and indirect 
relationships. A coalition’s cohesion is much stronger when there is a direct 
relation between the common interest of the coalition and the national interest of 
a state, and less strong when this relation is indirect. This is shown graphically 
below in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8.   The Strength of Transnational Coalitions 
Since military operations are expressions of political will, the degree of a 
coalition’s cohesion will influence the cohesion, as well as the commitments of 
the SOF elements involved in the execution of SCJSPECOPS.  
B. INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
Intelligence is a decisive factor in planning and executing successful 
military operations. Military operations are supported through an intelligence 
process consisting of five phases: planning and direction, collection, processing, 
analysis and production, and dissemination and integration. Even if the first four 
phases of the intelligence process are successfully carried out, the whole effort is 
useless if the final products of the intelligence process do not reach the end 
users.  
Since the Combined Joint Special Operations require the joint action of 
two or more special services, military branches or governmental agencies 
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belonging to two or more states, the intelligence dissemination phase involves 
intelligence sharing between those elements as well.  
First, intelligence must be shared at the international level between the 
concerned states, and at the national level between the military and 
governmental agencies of each state. This will help high-level decision makers to 
assess the situation and to decide if a unilateral or a combined action is required 
to solve the problem.  
Second, if it is agreed upon by SCJSPECOPS, intelligence must be 
shared between the national planning teams (or individual planners). This will 
allow them to efficiently tailor and task the combined joint task force in order to 
fulfill the common objectives.  
Third, after assembling the combined joint task force, intelligence must be 
shared between the CJSOTF elements. This will increase their proficient task 
performance and mutual support.   
C. INTEROPERABILITY 
Interoperability is important for military operations due to its triple role of 
catalyst, communicator, and decrypter. Due to the political-military particularities 
of SCJSPECOPS, interoperability must be achieved among countries’ 
governments, departments of defense, military services, and military branches 
and between the elements of special forces, conventional forces, and 
governmental agencies as well. 
Procedures alignment represents the final aim of acquiring interoperability 
within SCJSPECOPS. This goal is achieved by two convergent approaches. The 
first approach consists of acquiring organizational interoperability by harmonizing 
political objectives, as well as strategy and doctrine in order to align coalition 
operations. The second approach resides in obtaining technical interoperability 
by acquiring physical and protocol interoperability as the necessary prerequisite 
for operational interoperability.  
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Procedures alignment ensures that CJSOTOF elements will efficiently 
work together. This alignment creates the channels through which CJSOTOF 
elements offer and accept each other’s services. Moreover, it makes them 
capable of using and understanding the exchanged services and information.  
D. DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES  
Special operations represent an efficient method to achieve highly political 
outcomes at lower material and human costs. When Strategic Combined Joint 
Special Operations are used for fulfilling coalition common objectives, an 
appropriate division of responsibilities at the political-military and military levels is 
essential. Decisions concerning SCJSPECOPS are based on three main levels: 
national political-military level, combined joint political-military level, and 
combined joint military level.  
At the national and combined joint political-military levels, we can 
distinguish three main categories of decision makers: political leaders, national 
security professionals, and military professionals. These three categories of 
decision makers have two main purposes. The first is to evaluate the situation in 
order to identify if the use of Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations 
represents the best suitable course of action in solving the problem. The second 
is the creation of an interface between political-military decision makers and 
operational forces. Successfully fulfillment of these two important goals requires 
each of the three categories of decision makers to perform specific tasks. 
At the combined joint military level, division of responsibilities refers mainly 
to how the missions and tasks are assigned within CJSOTOF, and how they are 
influenced by two factors: national caveats and military proficiency. Depending 
on these two factors, the CJSOTF commander must clearly establish what type 
of task each CJSOTF element is capable of performing, as well as shape the 
mission of each element. 
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E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Understanding the principles of SCJSPECOPS is the first step in the 
successful execution of these operations. However, the goal of this thesis is not 
met unless a model for the practical application of these principles is proposed.  
Discussing division of responsibilities in the area of SCJSPECOPS, this 
thesis identified three levels of decision making: national political-military level, 
combined joint political-military level, and combined joint military level. 
Furthermore, for each of these levels, a model displaying the integration of 
SCJSPECOPS’ principles in the decision making process is proposed.  
1. Applying the Principles of SCJSPECOPS at the National 
Political-military Level 
At the national political-military level, the ultimate goal of the decision 
making process is to identify the available methods of protection or enforcement 
of the national interest. For a proper understanding of the situation, political 
leaders, military professionals, and national security specialists must honestly 
share the information they have on the concerned matter. In this way, they are 
able to decide if the problem may be solved by political methods or by the use of 
force. Moreover, if the decision is made to use force, these leaders are further 
able to examine all the aspects involved by utilizing unilateral or combined 
special operations to solve the problem.  
If an analysis of the situation shows that a SCJSPECOP is the 
recommended method, the final decision should be made after a two-stage 
comparative analysis. First, the relationship between national interest and the 
interest of the coalition must be scrutinized. Furthermore, it is necessary to 
analyze the degree of operational interoperability between the potential coalition 
partners. If the comparative analysis favors the use of SCJSPECOPS, then a 
national team can be assembled for further planning at the combined joint 
political-military level. The integration of the SCJSPECOPS’ principles in the 





Figure 9.   Decision Making Flowchart at the National Political-military Level 
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2. Applying the Principles of SCJSPECOPS at the Combined 
Joint Political-military Level 
At the combined joint political-military level — where the national political-
military teams work together — the final objective is to design the structure of the 
CJSOTF and to conceive the strategy of employing the CJSOTF in order to 
accomplish the coalition’s common objectives. Through a permanent exchange 
of information, national teams can work together to establish the battle order, the 
chain of command, the mission, and rules of engagement for CJSOTF. If the 
teams manage to reach an agreement on the aforementioned elements, then 
operational alignment, and doctrines and strategy harmonization, which are the 
prerequisites for an effective CJSOTF operation, are achieved. The decision-
making flowchart for establishing a CJSOTF at the combined joint political-
military level is shown in Figure 10.  
3. Applying the Principles of SCJSPECOPS at the Combined 
Joint Military Level 
The combined joint military level must be exclusively reserved for the 
military. Once high-level political-military decision makers establish the 
CJSOTF’s working framework, as well as its employment strategy, the military 
field experts apply this strategy at the tactical level by resorting to military means.  
First, at the CJSOTF level, military commanders must assess if it is 
possible to execute CJSOTF missions without jeopardizing them as a result of 
the limitations imposed by the ROE and national caveats. If any issues arise in 
this area, the decision makers at the combined joint political-military level must 
be informed in order to mitigate any ensuing problems. Second, military 
commanders must create the conditions for achieving technical interoperability 
between CJSOTF elements in order to align CJSOTF procedures. This process 
is shown in Figure 11.  
In order to increase a mission’s likelihood of success, military 
commanders must carefully assign the tasks within the CJSOTF. Even if 
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CJSOTF procedures are already aligned, not all the CJSOTF elements have the 
same proficiency in performing all missions. The efficiency with which a unit can 
undertake a task is influenced by mission requirements and unit and individual 
limitations, by national caveats, and by the military training and equipment. The 
nomination of a CJSOTF’s element for a mission’s execution should be done in 


































Figure 12.   Mission Assignment Flowchart at CJSOTF Level 
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